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IN IBE SUPREMt: COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

'

------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH,

vs.

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, )
Case No. 16913

ROBERT W. BOWEN,

)

Defendant-Respondent )

------------------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent was charged by an accusation filed by a
Weber County Grand Jury on or about December 27, 1979, stating
that

the

respondent

involving moral

had

turpitude

accusation was made under
Utah Code Annotated

been

convicted

or

malfeasance

of
in

a

misdemeanor

office.

The

the provisions of Section 77-7-1

(1953) as amended,

seeking to have the

respondent removed from office as Weber County Commissioner.
As of July 1, 1980, while this case was on appeal, Title 77 of
the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, was repealed without an express saving clause of any kind.
15 Section 1.

Laws, 1980 Chapter

A Utah Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted,

Laws 1980, Chapter 15, Section 2, with provisions extensively
changed and modified.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 21,

1980,

the Honorable

A.

H.

Ellett,

Sitting as a District Judge of the Second Judicial District
Court at Ogden,
County

grand

Utah,

dismissed the accusation of the Weber

jury.

The

dismissal

was

pursuant

respondent's written objection to the accusation,

to

the

and upon a

Court hearing and factual inquiry disclosing that there was no
evidence whatsoever in the record to justify the accusation.
This

case

is

an

appeal

by

the

appellant

of

that

order of dismissal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks that the Court affirm the order of
dismissal made by the District Court or enter its own order of
dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
An
respondent

Administrative

had

received

hearing

unemployment

determined
insurance

that

the

benefits

by

reason of false misrepresentations or statements or of failure
to report a material fact.
Annotated

Under Section 35-4-5(e) Utah Code

(1953) as amended,

the administrative remedies

the respondent was subj,ected to
provided

back of all benefits. received.
with

misrepresentation

Annotated

(1953)

as

under

amended,

for,

including

Subsequently,
Section

was

he was charged

35-4-19(a)

tried for

the pay

Utah

Code

a misdemeanor in

Circuit Court, and was convicted.

-2-
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On or about December 27th, a Weber County grand jury
charged the respondent by accusation under
Annotated

(1953)

misdemeanor

off ice.

as

amended,

involving

At

a

of

moral

hearing

of

having been

turpitude

the

77-7-1 Utah Codl'
convicted of

or

District

malfeasance

Court

on

or

a
in

about

January 21, 1980, the Court determined that the offense charged had occurred prior to the election and entry of the respondent to public office on or about January 1,
written objection of the respondent,
acusations

stating its

reason for

1979.

On the

the Court dismissed the

so doing

in

a memorandum

decision that there was no evidence whatsoever in the record
to justify the accusation.

He clearly indicated that

there

was no evidentiary showing before the Grand Jury to support
the

accusation

of

wrong

doing

office on or about January l,

1979,

should be dismissed.
laws so ruled.

any

subsequent
and

that

to

entering

the proceeding

The trial judge as the executor of our

The State has appealed that decision.

that decision has been on appeal,

the

1980

While

legislature has

repealed the statutory provisions under which the accusation
was brought.
ARGUMENT
The appellant claims a right to have the respondent
removed from office for having been convicted of a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude even if committed before the term of
off ice or even without any connection with the official duties
or reflection on that off ice.

It finds this claim in former
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section 77-7-1 Utah Code Annotated

(1953)

simple answer

that

to

this

been repealed by laws

assertion
of Utah,

effective July 1, 1980.

is

as

amended.

Section

1980 Chapter

15,

77-7-1

The
has

Section 1,

As stated in State ex rel Bennett et

al vs. Brown, 12 NW 2d 180, S. Ct. Minn. (1943),
••• on appeal there must be a substantial and
real controversy between the parties before a
case will be considered by this Court. The
principle is well established that where, as
here, a suit is founded on a statute and such
statute is repealed, without a saving clause,
before conclusion of the suit, the suit must
end where the repeal finds it. P. 181.
The appeal comes from an Order of Dismissal in the
District Court.
There is no express saving clause in the Repealing
Act.

Laws,

1980,

Chapter 15,

Section 1 simply states

Title 77 Utah Code Annotated (1953) is repealed.

that

However, the

legislative intent regarding the repeal should be determined
by

considering

the

nature

of

Title

77

and

the

subsequent

enactment of Section 2 of Chapter 15 which is the Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure.

No legislative intent to apply a general

saving clause should be made against
statutory changes

the

general

rule

that

in procedure have irrnnediate applicability.

If a statutory change is primarily procedural,
precedence over prior law.

it will take

The U •. S. Supreme Court has stated

that "the general saving clause does
discarded remedies or procedures".

not

ordinarly preserve

Warden vs.

Marrero,

417

U.S. 653, (1974) Ut 661.

-4-
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Recognizing that

cases will arise

in which

fairly be said that a statutory change both alters

it may
penalty

.1

and modifies a procedure, a Court may inquire into the predominent purpose of the
penal

reassessment

applies
U.

to

all

change to

-

procedural modification

determinte

proceedings

whether

pending

S. v Blue Sea Line 553 F2d 445,

at

such

its

C.A.

5

a

or

statute

effective

date.

(1977) U.S. vs.

Mechem, 509 F 2d 1193, CAlO (1975).
By
Title 77,

enacting

Chapter 6,

the

from

procedure.

code

of

criminal

Utah Code Annotated

the legis la tu re has not
removal

new

office,

changed
but

Under Utah law,

it

the
has

procedure,

(1953) as amended,

sanction.

It

completely

changed

County officers

are

is

still
the

subject

to

removal from office for cause and in a manner as provided by
law,

for

office.

high

crimes

and

misdemeanors

or

malfeasance

in

Utah constitution (1896) Art VI Sections 19 and 21

and Section 77-6-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended.
comparison of the former
statute

77-6-1,

is

not

77-7-1 will
a

substantial

statute under which the respondent is
enactment

does

not

show that

contemplate

a

the

present

re-enactment
charged.

requirement

A

of

the

The current
of

a

prior

conviction for crime, nor does it provide for any forefeiture
of office as a collateral effect of a

conviction.

It

does

significantly reduce the state's burden of proof improving the
means of enforcing sanctions.
It contemplates a cause of action against an offer
for acts of malfeasance or acts

-5-

involving a high degree of
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culpability so as to be nearly allied and equal in guilt to
felony or
degree.

other attrocious

crime,

and punishable

in

such a

cf. State vs. Knapp 6 Conn 415 S. Ct. of Errors, Conn

(1827).
It is doubtful that the law under 77-7-1 was different, and the new enactment is reflective of legislative intent
at all times.

From State vs. Jones 407 P2d 571 S. Ct.

Utah

(1965), it is clear that even moral turpitude and public outrage are matters of degree.

The term "high crime" includes

such moral turpitude, or is so offensive as necessary to set
the term apart from offenses which are obviously not included
with

robbery,

larceny,

rape, burglary,
not

to

embezzlement,

"

murder,

arson,

and many other atrocious crimes and felonies

be mentioned

among

Christians.

To

which

of

these

horrid crimes are the acts in question nearly allied or equal
in guilt?" State vs.

Knapp, supra, P 418.

The acts alleged by the accusation in this case are
punishable by a fine of not less

than $50. 00 nor more than

$250. 00 or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days,
both

fine

Annotated

and

imprisonment.

(1953)

as

Section

amended.

35-4-19 (a)

These acts

as

Utah

or by
Code

alleged nowhere

near approach the degree necessary for "high crimes and misdemeanors".

The new statute is

entirely procedural dealing

with manner, mode and degree of proof of high crimes and misdemeanors or malfeasance ·in office.

The old statute did no

more, but in a different manner, mode and degree.
is

procedural;

the

statute

in

-6-

the

accusation

The statute
is

repealed;
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and absent any other
:1rL'

dealt

litigation

with
it

legislative intent,

retrospectively.
develops

that

If

the

procedural changes

during

the

questions

course

of

originally

in

controversy between the parties are no longer in issue,

the

case should be dismissed.
POINT I
Public officials convicted of crimes involving
dishonesty and moral turpitude may be removed
from office pursuant to 77-7-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, even if the crimes were
cormnitted prior to taking office.
Where more

than

one

legal

basis

for

a

cause

of

action is in issue, and one is decided which is determinative
of the case, the second is moot and need not and should not be
decided.

If it is found necessary to address the entire issue

as presented by the appellant, it should be observed that the
purpose of a removal statute, as stated in People vs. Hale, 42

Ca R. 533, D. Ct. of Appeals, California (1965) •
••• does not test whether a county officer has
been a good man or a bad man as proved in a
preceding term. It only determines whether by
reason of existing facts and circumstances he
should be removed from his present office •
••• if an official commits a crime in connection
with the operation of his office, or wilfully or
corruptly fails or refuses to carry out a duty
prescribed by the law or by the charter, if any,
under which he holds his position, or if his
conduct as such officer is below the standard of
decency rightfully expected of a public official
••• he may be removed from his office as the
result of an accusation. pp. 537,538.

-7-
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State

ex

The

Florida

rel

Turner

Supreme
vs.

Court

Earl

,295

has

framed

So.

2d

the

609

rule

in

(1974)

as

follows:
••• we find that the rule supported by the great
weight of authority and specifically adopted by
this Court in construing statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing the removal of
public officers guilty of misconduct when such
provisions do not refer to the term of office in
which the misconduct occurred is that a public
official may not be removed from off ice for misconduct which he committed in another public
off ice or in a prior term of off ice in the
absence of disqualification to hold office
in the future because of such misconduct. P.613
The Utah Constitution (1896) Art. IV, Section 6 does
provide for
persons

disqualification

convicted

of

from holding public office

crimes,

but

only

offenses against elective franchise.

for

treason,

or

for
for

The Utah removal statute

makes no reference to the term of office for which the misconduct must occur.

The case must be stronger still where the

offense did not occur in connection with any public office,
such as the case here on review.

The provisions of Utah Law

suggest no reason not to apply the great weight of authority
cited by the Florida Court.
Two of the cases cited by the appellant,
rel Tabor ski vs.

Illinois AEEellate Court,

PeoEle ex

278 N.E.

2d 796,

and State ex rel ZemEel vs. Twitchell, 367 P2d. 985,

involve

the question of State constitutional provisions
for

forfeiture

felony.

of

office

for

conviction

and

and

statutes

sentencing

for

There is no such provision in Utah law, by statute or

by constitutional provision.

-8-
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Former Utah Statutory Law once provided for forfeiLurc of

off ice

upon

conviction

and

sentence

Section 76-1-36, Utah Code Annotated
the

statute

was

repealed,

Section

for

a

felony,

(1953) as amended,
76-10-1401,

Utah

but
Code

Annotated (1953) as amended.
There is no Utah public policy to warrant one

to

imply a constructive unfittness for office as suggested by the
appellant under the holding of State vs. Stavar, 578 P2d 847.
With the repeal of Section 77-7-1, all meaning has been with-

drawn from the Stavar holding.

If the legislature had intend-

ed that

forfeited

an

office

should

be

upon

conviction

crime, it could have passed a statute to that end.

of

The mean-

ing and purpose of a removal statute should not be construed
to do

indirectly what

directly.

the

legislature

has

refused

to

do

The fact of conviction of crime, in itself, has no

significance to Section 77-6-1 as presently enacted.
As to the other cases cited by the appellant

for

removal for prior acts, all involve a situation for misconduct
done in a prior term of the same public office from which
removal is

sought.

The opinions

all represent

a minority

exception to the rule stated in State ex rel Turner vs. Earle,
Supra.

None of them fit the facts of this case where there is

!!2_ misconduct

in any term of office.

cf.

Application of

Baker, 386 NY S 2d 313; Attorney General vs. Tufts, 131 NE 2d
573, 132 NE 2d 322; Bolton vs. Tully 158 A. 805; Hawkins vs.
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Common

Council,

City

of

Grand

Rapids,

matter of Corwin 218 NY S 2d 718;
Megaarden, 88 NW 412;

158

NW 953;

State ex rel

to

the

Douglas vs.

State ex rel Longerholm vs.

430 P 2d 304 None are directly in point as

In

Schroeder,

the

issue at

hand.
Probably the most direct reference to the issue in
this case is illustrated by Note 6, P. 614-615 of the Florida
Courts

Opinion

in

State

ex

rel

Turner

vs.

Earle,

Supra,

quoting from a Congressional Committee Report:
" ••• it hardly could have been the intendment of
the constitution that an officer could be
impeached for a crime committed by him before
his entry into the off ice from which he is to
be removed because if this were so, there is no
constitutional, and thus far, no legal limitation as to the time during which he may be held
so amenable to such impeachment •••
••• who will then dare assert that for offenses
committed ten years ago, yes, five years or one
year ago, before the election of a member the
House has power to expel! at its caprice •••
The

Utah

Constitution

(1896)

Art.

VI

Section

21

contemplates removal for cause in a manner similar to impeachment.

The

current

removal

statute

presumes

nothing

from

conviction for an offense committed outside of public office
and at ,a time prior to holding public office.
CONCLUSION
To remand for trial under a procedure that does not
exist

would

be

futile.

The

appeal

should

be

dismissed.

Should the Court reach the points raised by the appellant, on
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the bas is of the argument and supporting case law,

of

the

trial

court

dismissing

the

accusation

the order
should

be

affirmed.

Respectfully Submitted

DALE E. STRATFORD
Attorney for Respondent
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